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Double cross: Geographic profiling of V-2 impact sites
Between September 1944 and March 1945, more than a thousand V-2 rockets 
struck Great Britain, causing 2,754 deaths and 6,523 injuries.. Unlike the V-1, the 
V-2 could not be shot down, and M.I.5 responded with an ingenious scheme to 
mislead the Germans about the impact sites so they would shorten the range, 
missing Westminster and the docks. This is widely regarded as a success, with 
claims that the M.P.I. moved eastwards by two miles a week, ending outside 
London and saving 1,300 lives. Here, we use geographic profiling – a statistical 
technique originally developed to prioritise large lists of suspects in cases of 
serial crime – to show that this deception had little or no effect. Our results 
suggest rockets aimed at a single target would form clusters of 30 km radius, 
swamping the claimed movement. Our study shows how geographic profiling 
may be applied to diverse data sets beyond criminology and epidemiology.
Keywords: double cross; M.I.5, rocket; spatial analysis, V-2
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1. Introduction
At 6.41pm on September 8th, 1944, the first V-2 to fall on Britain struck the west 
London suburb of Chiswick near the junction of Burlington Lane and Staveley Road, 
killing three people; 16 seconds later the second fell 16 miles away near Epping 
(Dungan 2005). Over the next six months, over a thousand rockets fell on Britain, 
around half of them in and around London, causing a total of 2,754 deaths and 6,523 
injuries (Andrew 2012). Individual attacks could be devastating: one rocket which 
struck Hughes Mansions in Vallance Road in London’s East End on March 27th, 1945 
(Figure 1) killed 134 people, while another that fell on Woolworths in New Cross on 
November 25th 1944 killed 160 people (Figure 1)..
With a maximum altitude of 88 km and a speed of up to 5,760 km hour–1, the V-
2 was essentially invulnerable to anti-aircraft fire and to attacks by fighter aircraft, both 
of which had been successful against the V-1 ‘flying bombs’ (although there is an 
account of a V-2 being shot down by a Liberator (Johnson 1982), it is unclear whether 
this was an actual event or allied propaganda). In the absence of direct countermeasures, 
British intelligence instead adapted a scheme that they had already used in response to 
the V-1 flying bombs: 
‘The dilemma facing M.I.5 [Military Intelligence section 5; the UK’s 
domestic counter-intelligence and security agency] was that the Germans were now 
telling their supposed London agents to report the times and places of flying bomb 
incidents in London. If, to preserve the security of possible future deceptions, we 
were to supply truthful information to the Germans, this would be aiding the 
enemy. If, on the other hand, we supplied false information, then this could be 
checked by German photographic reconnaissance, in which case the agents would 
be ‘blown’ and future deception plans ruined. […]
It immediately occurred to me that photographic reconnaissance could only 
reveal the points of impact, and not the times. Moreover, I knew from previous 
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experience that while agents could usually define the place of an incident fairly 
well, they were likely to be wrong in other details, even the times.
I had noticed that in the Peenemünde trials the bombs tended to fall short 
of the target, and now knew from the plot of bombs for the first 24 hours that the 
operational bombs were also tending to fall short, with the centre of gravity being 
in south-east London, near Dulwich. In a flash I saw that we might be able to keep 
the bombs falling short, which would mean fewer casualties in London as a whole, 
and at the same time avoid arousing any suspicions regarding the genuineness of 
the agents.
We could give correct points of impact for bombs that tended to have a 
longer range than usual, but couple these with times of bombs which in fact had 
fallen short. Thus, if the Germans attempted any correlation, they might be led to 
think that the bombs which they had reason to think might have fallen short were 
instead tending to fall in north-west London. Therefore, if they made any 
correction at all, it would be to reduce the average range.’ (Jones 1978)
JC Masterman, the chairman of the Double-Cross Committee (see below), tells a similar 
story in a document originally written as a report for M.I.5 in 1945 but published 
publically 27 years later (Masterman 1972):
‘Early in September the rocket attacks (V-2) started, and presented us with similar 
problems and similar opportunities to those connected with V-1. Consequently, our 
deception was also on similar lines. There was, however, a technical difference. In 
the flying bomb attacks location had been the important factor because it was 
doubtful whether the enemy could tie the times we gave them to particular shots; in 
the rocket attacks timings were vital because the enemy could calculate accurately 
the time of arrival of any shot, and link this up with any information which we 
gave him. It was therefore decided to give real incidents which would show an 
M.P.I. [mean point of impact] in Central London, but to give as the times for those 
incidents the times of shots falling some five to eight miles short. In this way over 
a period of some months we contrived to encourage the enemy steadily to diminish 
his range; thus in the four weeks from 20 January to 17 February 1945 the real 
M.P.I. moved eastward about two miles a week and ended well outside the 
boundary of London region.’ (Masterman 1972)
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It is interesting to note in passing the discrepancy between Jones’s account, which 
suggests that time was a factor in both the V-1 and V-2 deceptions, with Masterman’s 
version, which highlights this as the key difference between the V-1 and V-2 
deceptions.
Crucial to this deception was the Twenty Committee, which later became known 
as the Double-Cross Committee because of the representation of 20 in Roman numerals 
as XX. The Double-Cross Committee used Nazi agents in Britain to broadcast 
disinformation to the Germans in a way that would benefit the Allies, and it did so 
astonishingly effectively. Masterman (1972) claimed that M.I.5 effectively ran and 
controlled the German espionage system in Britain. Startlingly, it became clear after the 
war that all of the agents sent to Britain had either been captured or had given 
themselves up, with the possible exception of one who committed suicide (Masterman 
1972, Macintyre 2012).
The two key double agents in the V-2 story were Tate and Rover. Tate (Wulf 
Schmidt, later known as Harry Williamson) parachuted into England in September 
1940. However, he had been betrayed by a previously captured agent. The agent, Gösta 
Caroli, was a friend of Schmidt, and made Schmidt’s protection a condition of his 
cooperation; Schmidt was told that Caroli had betrayed him and, furious, swapped sides 
(Macintyre 2012). Although none of Tate’s reports on V-2 impacts seem to have 
survived in either British or German files, Masterman told a meeting of the Double 
Cross Committee on 18 January 1945 that the Germans were strongly influenced by 
Tate and Rover’s reports on V-2 strikes. Tate, in fact, so completely deceived the 
Germans that one Abwehr official believed his reports about the plans for D-day could 
‘even decide the outcome of the war’ (Masterman 1972; Jonason & Olsson 2012). 
Rover was a Polish sailor who had been captured by the Nazis and used as forced 
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labourer before being offered the opportunity to spy for the Germans. He arrived in 
Gibraltar and immediately confessed to the authorities, before being sent to England in 
1944 to work as a double agent. However, the Germans failed to respond to his initial 
contacts and he was allowed to return to the Polish Navy. Shortly after this the Germans 
contacted him, and in his absence a British operator familiar with his technique as a 
wireless operator was successfully used as a substitute. This substitute then became ill 
and died, and a second substitute was found after a short interval, managing to explain 
the gap in transmissions by claiming he had been hit by a lorry during the blackout 
(Masterman 1972; Crowdy 2011). 
There is good evidence that the V-1 and V-2 deception operations worked; 
according to Andrew (2012) the Security Service reported to Churchill that during 
January 1945 that ‘TATE and ROVER have been successfully applying misleading 
information about the fall of V.1. and V.2., and there is some reason to believe that their 
messages are having an effect of the places where the missiles are falling’. The 
following monthly report concluded ‘TATE and ROVER have continued to supply 
misleading information about the fall of V.2 and it is now possible to conclude with 
some certainty that the shift to the north-east of London of the mean point of impact of 
V.2 is due to reports from Special Agents’ (Andrew 2012). Masterman (1972) cites a 
captured German map based on agents’ reports that showed the M.P.I. in the Charing 
Cross area, and points out that this was exactly what British Intelligence wished the 
Germans to believe. Similarly, Jones (1978) refers to a captured map with a written 
comment addressing the discrepancy between data from the small number of V-1’s 
fitted with radio transmitters (the existence of these was unknown to M.I.5 at the time) 
which suggested that the bombs were tending to fall short, and data from the agents who 
claimed they were overshooting (Figure 2).. The comment states that the agents are 
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particularly reliable, and that there must therefore be something wrong with the radio 
D/F method (Jones 1978). It is obviously impossible to put precise figures on the 
number of lives that might have been saved by this deception, but Andrew (2012) 
suggests 1,300 more dead and 10,000 more injured, in addition to the other 
consequences of additional impacts on the area between Westminster and the docks. 
The problem with the claim that the mean point of impact moved eastward as a 
result of this deception is that the spatial mean is not a good metric to use, since it will 
be biased by bombs falling in other areas – for example, Norwich, Southend and 
Canvey Island. Here, we address this issue with a re-analysis of the data that uses 
geographic profiling to clust r the impacts, and then looks specifically at the cluster 
centred on London.
Geographic profiling was originally developed in criminology, where it is used 
to prioritise the large lists of suspects typical in investigations of serial crime (for 
example murder). In this context, the model uses the spatial locations of linked crimes 
to make inferences about the most likely locations of the offender’s ‘anchor point’ – 
usually a home or workplace, but sometimes a relative’s home. It is routinely used by 
law enforcement agencies around the world (Rossmo 2000), and its success in this field 
has led in the last few years to its application to more varied datasets, notably in biology 
and epidemiology (Le Comber & Stevenson 2012; Faulkner et al. 2016; Faulkner et al. 
2018), where it can be used to find – for example – the sources of outbreaks of 
infectious disease (e.g., using the addresses of patients suffering from malaria to find 
the breeding sites of the mosquitoes that spread the malarial parasite) (Verity et al. 
2014). It has also been applied to more esoteric cases such as Banksy artworks or 
instances of human-tiger conflict (Hauge et al. 2016; Struebig et al. 2018). This 
application to datasets that – unlike criminal investigations – may feature multiple 
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sources, and where the number of sources is unknown, has gone hand-in-hand with the 
development of more rigorous Bayesian models, notably the Dirichlet Process Mixture 
(DPM) model introduced in Verity et al. (2014) and extended in Faulkner et al. (2016).
Here, we use the DPM model to analyse the spatial locations of V-2 impacts on 
England during the second world war.Second World War. Specifically, we ask (1) 
whether there is any evidence of clustering of impact sites within London; (2) whether 
the M.P.I. of rockets striking London does indeed move eastwards, especially over the 
crucial period in January-February 1945. 
2. Methods
Data
Data for 1,115 V-2 strikes were obtained from https://www.wrsonline.co.uk, which 
details accounts of V-2 bomb locations and victims within Britain. The website provides 
a map of all V-2 strikes within Britain, compiled using official data from The Ministry 
of Defence’s document AIR 20/4126 ‘Big Ben’. Source code was downloaded for this 
map in JSON format. Geographical strike site data were extracted and converted to 
CSV format using an online data converter 
(https://www.doogal.co.uk/BatchGeocoding.php). One strike site with incomplete 
geographical location data was excluded, leaving 1,115 data points detailing location 
(latitude and longitude) and date (day, month and year) of each strike site. 
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The Dirichlet Process Mixture model
The Dirichlet process mixture model was introduced in Verity et al. (2014) and 
extended in Faulkner et al. (2016); crucially, it provides a mathematically robust way of 
estimating source locations from the spatial locations of the observations, even where 
the number of sources is unknown.  The model breaks down the difficult problem of 
estimating the locations of multiple sources into two much simpler problems using a 
Gibbs sampler (Geman & Geman 1984). First the model partitions the observations into 
clusters, with observations that are close together more likely derived from the same 
source. Second, the model estimates the locations of the sources, conditional on the 
clustering in the first step. The model repeats these steps many thousands of times using 
standard Bayesian Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods until it converges on 
the posterior distribution of interest (Verity et al. 2014; Faulkner et al. 2016). In this 
study, the locations of the estimated sources are considered analogous to the M.P.I. in 
Masterman (1972), with the important difference that this ‘mean’ is restricted to the 
impacts associated with the cluster in/around London and is therefore not biased by the 
inclusion of more distant impacts.
Model implementation
The DPM model described here was implemented in R (R Core Team 2015) using 
version 2.1.0 of the package Rgeoprofile introduced by Verity et al. (2014) and 
extended in Faulkner et al (2016); this package is available at 
https://github.com/bobverity/Rgeoprofile. Model settings are explained in detail in 
Verity et al (2014). First, we ran the model on the full set of impact locations using the 
settings sigma_mean = 1, sigma_var = NULL, sigma_squared_shape = 2, samples = 
100,000, chains = 10, burnin = 1000. These settings correspond to a very diffuse prior 
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on sigma, so that the model would fit the cluster size from the data. For all subsequent 
analyses, we used this fitted value of sigma with sigma_var = 0, and 
sigma_squared_shape = NULL, ensuring that the model fitted clusters of consistent 
size. 
Hitscore percentage
The model’s performance is assessed by the hitscore percentage. In a criminal 
investigation, the suspect site’s hitscore is the proportion of the geoprofile that must be 
searched before that site is located; the lower the hit score, the higher priority the 
‘suspect’. In this instance, the hit score percentage can be thought of as analogous to the 
extent to which an area is targeted.
Mean point of impact and median point of impact
Starting from the first impacts on September 8th, 1944, we calculated rolling mean and 
median point of impact in daily periods of 14-day groups; that is, from September 8-21 
1944, September 9-22, etc, until March 18-31, 1944. We also calculated mean point of 
impact in the same way, but restricting the analysis to strikes within London. (defined 
as all boroughs falling under the Greater London Authority; this largely corresponds to 
the London Civil Defence Region used in Evans and Delaney (2018)). Over the same 
windows, we also ran the Dirichlet Process Mixture model, as described above, 
extracting at each step the most likely position for the source of those points assigned to 
the cluster closest to London. If no ‘source’ was within 10 km of Tower Bridge (the 
actual target, according to Jones (1978)),), although Williams (2013) suggests the first 
rockets were targeted at Southwark Fire Station, approximately 2 km away), no mean 
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was calculated.
Poisson analysis
Following Clarke (1946), we divided the area into a 32 x 32 grid encompassing the 
strikes allocated to the London cluster by the DPM and compared the numbers of strikes 
per cell to those expected with a Poisson distribution, i.e. if the distribution of impacts is 
purely random. 
3. Results
Clustering within London
Table 1 shows the observed and expected number of cells with zero to four strikes when 
the data are restricted to impacts allocated by the DPM to the cluster in and around 
London. This shows a significant departure for the numbers expected under a Poisson 
distribution (chi squared test: X2 = 285.78, df = 4, p < 0.0001).
Geographic profiling
Running the model with the complete list of impact locations yielded a fitted sigma 
value of 10.02 km, which we rounded to 10 km. Sigma represents the standard deviation 
(in km) of the dispersal distribution around the source. A sigma value of 10 km 
therefore implies that 39% of the impacts events occur within 10 km from the source, 
87% within 20 km and 99% within 30 km. Overall, the DPM model assigned 679 
strikes to the central London cluster (note that this number does not correspond to the 
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729 strikes in Table 1 that landed within the London Region, since not all of these were 
assigned to this cluster). This cluster had mean location 51.54060º latitude, 0.05340516º 
longitude, close to Plashet Park in the east end of London, approximately 10 km 
WSWENE of Tower Bridge. The mean inter-strike distance for the points assigned to 
this cluster was 16.91 km, close to the mean distance between points in a bivariate 
normal distribution with standard deviation equal to this fitted value of sigma, which is 
given by sigma * pi^0.5; in this case, 17.7km. Therefore, the mean distance between 
points is also consistent with a roughly bivariate normal distribution. 
The full geoprofile is shown in Figure 3a2a, with a close-up of the London area 
in Figure 3b2b. Profiles for the four weeks between January 20th and February 16th 1945 
– the period during which Masterman (1972) states that the mean point of impact 
(M.P.I.) moved eastward at a rate of around two miles per week – are shown in Figure 
43.
Mean and median points of impact, and London M.P.I
Figure 54 shows the results of the mean point of impact, median point of impact, mean 
point of impact for strikes within London and the mean point of impact for the London 
cluster identified by the DPM, calculated daily for rolling windows of 14 days from the 
first strike to the last. 
4. Discussion
Our results suggest that although the Germans were almost certainly deceived in exactly 
the way the Double Cross Committee intended, this had little or no impact on the 
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precise locations where V-2 rockets struck London, largely because of the rockets’ 
inaccuracy. 
The evidence from this study suggests that the V-2 was accurate only within 
very broad limits. The fitted sigma value of 10 km suggests clusters in which 99% of 
impacts fall within an area with a diameter of 60 km – too large for the Double Cross 
Committee’s deception to have any measurable effect. A cluster with radius 30 km 
centred on Tower Bridge would stretch all the way from Heathrow in the west to 
Tilbury in the east, and from close to Welwyn Garden City in the north to Godstone in 
the south, an area roughly comparable to the whole of the region bounded by the M25 
today.(the motorway encircling almost all of Greater London) today. The claimed 
movement of the M.P.I. of two miles east per week in January-February 1945 is no 
greater than the random shifts in M.P.I. in other directions across the whole 
bombardment.
 Historical evidence also supports this view of the precision with which the 
rockets could be targeted. The first two rockets to strike London – 16 seconds apart, and 
presumably aimed at the same target – landed 16 miles (25 km) apart. Similarly, when 
the Germans attempted to use V-2 rockets against the Ludendorff Bridge at the Battle of 
Remagen (the V-2’s first use against a tactical target), although most strikes were 
clustered within a few kilometres of the target, one rocket missed the bridge by less than 
a kilometre, but another struck Cologne, 64 km away 
(v2rocket.com,/start/deployment/v2s-on-remagen.html, retrieved 1 November 2018). 
Churchill himself stated that ‘The average error of both of these weapons [the V-1 and 
V-2] was over ten miles’ (Ordway and Sharpe 1982). Clearly, this error swamps – for 
example – differences between targets within central London such as Tower Bridge or 
Southwark Fire Station, (< 2 km apart). Note that although other targets included 
Page 12 of 25
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/tjss  Email: g.l.wright@curtin.edu.au
Journal of Spatial Science
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
13
Norwich, approximately 180km away, as well as Southend and Canvey Island 
(V2Rocket.com), in our analysis the DPM model assigns these strikes to separate 
clusters which do not affect our estimate of the cluster centred on London. Interestingly, 
recent research suggests that the M.P.I. of V-1 strikes was within 3.5 km of the centroid 
of the County of London (Evans and Delaney 2018), pointing out that high-resolution 
accuracy may be relatively unimportant when missiles with low accuracy are aimed at 
large targets such as cities.
Although the mean point of impact does indeed move eastwards by considerable 
distances over the course of the analysis, this is largely a consequence of including 
much more distant strikes in the analysis. Restricting the analysis to the strikes allocated 
by the DPM to London shows movement on a much smaller spatial scale, but again 
there is no clear move eastwards. The same is true if we consider the M.P.I. for those 
strikes within London.
Attempts to understand spatial patterns of bombardment predate the V-2. Clarke 
(1946) examined the locations of V-1 impacts in south-east London (not V-2 impacts, 
as is sometimes mistakenly claimed) and showed that the data exhibited an excellent fit 
to a Poisson distribution, suggesting that the bombs did not cluster more than expected. 
This is perhaps surprising, since a Poisson distribution would be expected only if the 
chances of strikes were equal across the whole area, which is unlikely if the bombs were 
aimed at a particular target.; see Evans and Delaney (2018) for a more recent analysis. 
Interestingly, our analysis suggested a significant departure from the pattern expected 
under a Poisson distribution, as would be expected if the actual pattern forms a bivariate 
normal distribution around a central point (as the DPM assumes).
Perhaps the most striking contrast is between the extent to which the Double 
Cross Committee’s deception succeeded, and the lack of a measurable effect. A large 
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factor in the success of the deception’s effect was due to MI5’s success in dealing with 
German agents in UK, but this was aided by the lack of German photographic 
reconnaissance of London, although this was not known to the Double Cross Committee 
at the time. In fact, there was no German photographic reconnaissance of London 
between January 10th 1941 and September 10th 1944, largely because of the Fighter 
Command’s efficiency in intercepting attempts (Jones 1978), so the only information 
available to the Germans came via the compromised agents.
5. Conclusions
Overall, our study finds no support for the idea that the Double Cross’s deception had 
any practical effect on the locations of V-2 strikes in London. Across the whole 
bombardment, the brunt of the strikes was borne by the area around Ilford. The most 
charitable conclusion that can be drawn is that perhaps the deception operated 
successfully from the first V-2 impact to the last. This is not entirely implausible, given 
that we know the origins of the deception predate the V-2 and that substantially the 
same approach was used with the V-1. It does, however, contradictHowever, we believe 
this is unlikely, contradicting as it does both Masterman’s view that the deception’s 
effect applied principally to the period from mid-January 1945 to mid-February the 
same year (Masterman 1972).), and Evans and Delaney (2018)’s finding that deceptions 
undertaken by British Intelligence did not significantly alter the geography of V-1 
impacts in London.  Dornberger, who led the V-1 and V-2 development programmes 
and worked closely with Werner von Braun, stated that most intelligence came too late 
to be useful to correct aim (Dornberger 1954). According to Dornberger, the V-2 was 
not as effective as it should have been because it was deployed when it was not yet fully 
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developed as a result of repeated delays due to bureaucratic and budgetary issues 
(Dornberger 1954).
It is hard to view the V-weapon programme as a success, except perhaps in 
propaganda terms. Hitler’s view was that the programme saved men and aircraft, but 
even if all 25,000 V-1 and V-2s had impacted at or near their target they would have 
delivered only 25,000 tons of explosive. This figure can be compared to 36,000 tons of 
explosive dropped on V-weapon launch sites in the six months leading up to D-Day. 
Certainly some of the Nazi hierarchy took thisOn the other hand, Evans and Delaney 
(2018) show how even relatively inaccurate missile systems (such as the V-1) can be 
effective against large targets such as cities, and it is undeniable that the vengeance 
weapons caused considerable alarm; indeed, the British government was sufficiently 
concerned about this to disguise the first V-2 impacts as gas explosions (Williams 
2013). Certainly, though, some of the Nazi hierarchy took a more negative view: for 
example, Speer claimed in 1945 that ‘from the point of view of their technical 
production the rockets were a very expensive affair for us, and their effect compared to 
the cost of their output was negligible’. In fact, at $3 billion, the V-weapon programme 
cost a billion dollars more than the Manhattan Project (Ordway and Sharpe 1982). 
More broadly, our results show for the first time how the DPM model of 
geographic profiling can be used to analyse the movement of clusters over time, an 
issue likely to be applicable in other areas; for example, modelling the spread of an 
invasive species over time, or changing patterns of disease transmission.
T.H. Huxley famously stated that the great tragedy of science was the slaying of 
a beautiful theory by an ugly fact (Huxley 1894). The coupling of spatial data from 
bombs that overshot with the temporal data from bombs that fell short was a beautiful 
and elegant idea, and a simple analysis of mean point of impact seems to support the 
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claim that it was highly effective. Sadly, the ugly fact of a more sophisticated analysis 
appears to kill it.
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FIGURE LEGENDS 
Figure 1. After-effects of a V-2 strike on Hughes Mansions, Vallance Road, London at 
7.21 a.m. on March 27th, 1945, that killed 134 people. © IWM (HU 88803). 
Figure 2. A captured German map showing impacts of V-1s on London from 
information by German agents (dark circles) and as indicated by radio transmitters in a 
subset of missiles (white circles). Copyright Penguin Books.
Figure 3. Geoprofiles based on all V-2 impacts (a), with a close up of the peak nearest 
central London (b). Black circles show impact sites. The red cross marks the location of 
Trafalgar Square in the centre of London.
Figure 43. Week-by-week geoprofiles showing the London peak for the four crucial 
weeks between January 20th and February 16th 1945, during which Masterman (1972) 
claimed that the mean point of impact moved eastwards by 2 miles a week. Black 
circles show points of impact. Again, the red cross marks the location of Trafalgar 
Square.
Figure 54. Daily rolling estimates of (a) mean point of impact; (b) median point of 
impact; (c) mean point of impact for strikes occurring within London; and (d) mean 
point of impact of strikes allocated by the DPM to the London cluster. In each case the 
earlier data are shown in red, and the later data in blue.
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TABLES
Table 1. Number of cells with zero to four V-2 strikes for the London impacts.
Number of strikes Observed Expected
0 591 572.63
1 107 138.25
2 26 16.69
3 3 1.34
4 2 0.08
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Figure 1. After-effects of a V-2 strike on Hughes Mansions, Vallance Road, London at 7.21 a.m. on March 
27th, 1945, that killed 134 people. © IWM (HU 88803). 
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Figure 2. Geoprofiles based on all V-2 impacts (a), with a close up of the peak nearest central London (b). 
Black circles show impact sites. The red cross marks the location of Trafalgar Square in the centre of 
London. 
1948x812mm (72 x 72 DPI) 
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Figure 3. Week-by-week geoprofiles showing the London peak for the four crucial weeks between January 
20th and February 16th 1945, during which Masterman (1972) claimed that the mean point of impact 
moved eastwards by 2 miles a week. Black circles show points of impact. Again, the red cross marks the 
location of Trafalgar Square. 
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Figure 4. Daily rolling estimates of (a) mean point of impact; (b) median point of impact; (c) mean point of 
impact for strikes occurring within London; and (d) mean point of impact of strikes allocated by the DPM to 
the London cluster. In each case the earlier data are shown in red, and the later data in blue. 
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